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PROOF OF PERJURY AND THE "TWO WITNESSES"
REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Lester B. Orfield*
T HE purpose of this Article is to examine in detail the "two
witnesses" or "corroborating evidence" rule in federal perjury
cases. The review is undertaken at this time for two reasons: (1)
because there is a continuing flow of cases which deal with this
important area of criminal law; and (2) since recent drafts of penal
codes have proposed an important change in the law. The subject
matter is presented as follows: first, the rule, its exceptions, and the
underlying policy are discussed; second, there is a brief note on the
type of proof required in a perjury case, followed by a study of the
actual application of the "two witnesses" rule; and finally, the
proposed changes are mentioned.
I. THE "Two WITNESSES" OR "CORROBORATING EVIDENCE" RULE
AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
In 1840, Mr. Justice Thompson of the Supreme Court, in a dis-
senting opinion in United States v. Wood, summarized the law con-
cerning the number of witnesses required to prove perjury:
The rule, as we find it laid down in the elementary books on this
subject, is, that to convict a party of the crime of perjury, two wit-
nesses are necessary to contradict him as to the fact upon which the
perjury is assigned; and the reason assigned for the rule is, that if
one witness only is produced, there will only be one oath against an-
other. This rule, however, in the early adjudged cases, was so modified
as to require but one living witness, corroborated by circumstances,
to contradict the oath of the defendant; and with this modification
the rule has remained until the present day.'
However, in that case the Supreme Court held that written testimony
alone might be enough. The Court stated:
Or in what cases may a living witness to the corpus delicti of a de-
fendant be dispensed with, and documentary or written testimony be
relied upon to convict? We answer, to all such where a person is
charged with a perjury, directly disproved by documentary or written
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B., LL.B., University of Minnesota; M.A., Duke
University; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Brandeis Research Fellow, Harvard University;
member, United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure
(1941-46); consultant on American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence (1939-42);
author, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal (1947), Criminal Appeals in America
(1939).
'United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430, 444 (1840).
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testimony springing from himself, with circumstances showing the
corrupt intent. In cases where the perjury charged is contradicted by
a public record, proved to have been well known to the defendant
when he took the oath; the oath only being proved to have been taken.
In cases where a party is charged with taking an oath contrary to what
he must necessarily have known to be the truth, and the false swearing
can be proved by his own letters, relating to the fact sworn to, or by
other written testimony existing and being found in the possession of
a defendant, and which has been treated by him as containing the
evidence of the fact recited in it.'
The decision sets out what is now known as the "documents excep-
tion" to the rule requiring two witnesses or one witness and cor-
roborating evidence to convict a person of perjury. When this ex-
ception is applied, it permits the complete substitution of documents
for testimony by the witnesses. As one court stated: "In the federal
cases in which documents have been used to establish perjury, the
documents have, for practical purposes, directly established the
falsity of the statement under oath."3
Recent cases continue to apply the exception. For example, in a
prosecution for perjury committed during his trial for mail fraud,
the defendant had testified that he cut five stencils and prepared a
document from the stencils on the same day. The government proved
that the fifth and incriminating stencil was in fact not part of the
original document in issue, and the evidence was clear that the first
four stencils had been cut some time prior to the fifth. It was held
that such a document, written by the defendant, was direct proof
of the crime and that no direct testimony from a living witness was
necessary.
In a case involving the prosecution of a physician for perjury while
testifying in a robbery prosecution against his patient, a medication
card and appointment book record showing appointments and treat-
ments were held to constitute documentary or written testimony
springing from the defendant.5 The physician was convicted for
swearing under oath in a criminal proceeding against his patient
' Id. at 441. In this case the defendant's letters and invoice books were held to be suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction for perjury, The case was approved and followed in Hammer v.
United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926); United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961); United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1959);
United States v. Lester, 248 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Buckner, 118 F.2d
468 (2d Cir. 1941); Jacobs v. United States, 31 F.2d 568 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
869 (1929); United States v. Baer, 6 Fed. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1880); United States v. Mayer,
26 Fed. Cas. 1225 (No. 15753) (D. Ore. 1865).
Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1950).4 Barker v. United States, 198 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1952).
'See United States v. Spaeth, 152 F. Supp. 216 (N.D. Ohio 1952), aff'd, 254 F.2d
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958).
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that he had treated the patient on the date of the offense in issue.
The government proved that the date in the record book from
which he testified had been altered. It was held that this was direct
documentary proof of the guilt of the physician.
Thus, in effect no witnesses may be required in perjury cases in-
volving the documents exception "save as to the identity of physical
objects having circumstantial relevancy."6 In contrast, in treason
cases two witnesses are always required to prove overt acts. Even in
a recent misdemeanor case concerning the statutory offense of verbal
invitation to commit sodomy, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that the testimony of a single witness should be
received and considered only with great caution
There are several other exceptions to the "corroborating evidence"
rule. First, no contradicting witness is required if direct observation
was not feasible. This type of case arises when a defendant is charged
with perjury as to his own mental state, as for example, when he
states, "I don't remember." In such a situation, as in Benrle v. United
States, the prosecution can proceed wholly on circumstantial evi-
dence.8 In the Behrle case the defendant had made a written state-
ment in July describing the shooting of another person. Later, in
November, he made the same statement on oath to the grand jury.
However, three weeks later at the trial of the person charged with
crime he denied all recollection of having made any part of the
statement, although he admitted his signature. Circumstantial evi-
dence that he must have remembered was enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence and to leave no reasonable doubt of the
defendant's perjury.
Another exception is that an authenticated record of convictions is
sufficient to demonstrate the falsity of a defendant's sworn denial
that he had ever been convicted of crime.' In the case enunciating
this rule there was testimony by one witness supported-by docu-
mentary evidence.
A third exception exists when a defendant admits prior false
testimony. In one case the defendant testified at the trial of two
8 United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899
(1961). In England it is not certain whether proof without any witness would be sufficient.
See Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law § 598, at 482 n.2 (17th ed. Turner 1958).
'Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Special weight was given to
evidence of the accused's good character, and his conviction was reversed.
'Behrle v. United States, 100 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The court cited People v.
Doody, 172 N.Y. 165, 64 N.E. 807 (1902). See also United States v. Nicoletti, 310 F.2d
359 (7th Cir. 1962); 51 Colum. L. Rev. 1056 (1951); 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 786 (1960).
'United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956). See also Holy v.
United States, 278 Fed. 521 (7th Cir. 1921).
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police officers that her sworn testimony at the grand jury hearing
prior to the trial was untrue and was given to save her husband.
She was indicted for perjury. At her trial she asserted under oath
the falsity of her testimony before the grand jury and was con-
victed. On appeal it was held that further proof of perjury was
unnecessary, since the defendant's testimony was the practical equiva-
lent of a plea of guilty.1" A previous case had held that when a
defendant at the perjury trial expressly admitted that previous testi-
mony was false, the evidence was sufficient. 1 In 1952, the Fifth
Circuit held that although subsequent inconsistent testimony was
accompanied by an admission that the previous testimony was false,
corroboration was still required. In that case the defendant did not
testify and formally recant. She simply admitted before the grand
jury that a prior statement made by her before a United States Com-
missioner was false. Probably the fact that the defendant did not
testify at the perjury trial distinguishes this case from the apparently
conflicting cases which do excuse the absence of corroborating testi-
mony when the defendant himself testifies concerning his false
statements.
II. APPLICATION OF THE RULE
A. Attitude Of The Courts
The lower federal courts have generally adhered to the rule re-
quiring corroborating evidence. In 1907 the Ninth Circuit approved
an instruction that the government must prove the guilt of one
charged with perjury by the testimony of two witnesses or by the
testimony of one witness and corroborating circumstances.13 In 1909
the Eighth Circuit stated that the old "strictness [the absolute re-
quirement of two witnesses] has long since been relaxed, and we
find many cases in the books where convictions have been sustained
upon the testimony of a single witness, corroborated by circum-
stances proved by independent evidence sufficient to warrant the jury
in saying that they believe one rather than the other."'" The Second
10 United States v. Buckner, 118 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1941), noted, 28 Va. L. Rev. 102
(1941).
" Pawley v. United States, 47 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1931); see 7 Wigmore, Evidence
2042, at 282 (3d ed. 1940).
"2McWhorter v. United States, 193 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1952); see 9 Austl. L.J. 151
(1935); 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1165 (1955).
'a Holmgren v. United States, 156 Fed. 439 (9th Cir. 1907). The Supreme Court affirmed
without express consideration of the point, 217 U.S. 509 (1910). See also Arena v. United
States, 226 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954 (1956); Pawley v. United
States, 47 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1931).
4 Hashagen v. United States, 169 Fed. 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1909). See also Gordon v.
United States, 5 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1925).
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Circuit subscribed to this view in 1914."' In 1912'6 and 1922"' the
Fourth Circuit followed suit, stating that "there is no suggestion
that the rule as laid down in . . .United States v. Wood ...is not
in substance still binding on the courts. '"s However, in a 1938 case
the Fourth Circuit struck a discordant note by expressing doubt that
the old perjury rule should be continued and by denying the need for
an instruction on the subject to the jury, particularly when the error
was harmless."9
The other circuits followed the majority rule. In 1921 the Seventh
Circuit" and in 1932 the Third Circuit adopted the corroboration
rule, the latter stating: "This is an inflexible rule of the common
law applicable to every charge of perjury and must be enforced by
the court until changed by statute."" Finally, in 1944 the Sixth
Circuit" and in 1954 the District of Columbia Circuit 3 joined the
others in requiring corroboration.
The Supreme Court has approved the same approach. For ex-
ample, in 1941 the Court stated in dictum: "An uncorroborated con-
fession or evidence of perjury, given by one witness only, does not
as a matter of law establish beyond a reasonable doubt the commis-
sion of a crime. ... "" That position was reaffirmed in 1954 when
the Supreme Court upheld the old rule. Justice Black, speaking for
the Court, stated the policy considerations in favor of the orthodox
view:
"5Kahn v. United States, 214 Fed. 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 763 (1914);
see United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1948); Schonfeld v. United States,
277 Fed. 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 623 (1921).
'eAllen v. United States, 194 Fed. 664 (4th Cir. 1912).
"Clayton v. United States, 284 Fed. 537 (4th Cir. 1922).
'" Allen v. United States, 194 Fed. 664, 668 (4th Cir. 1912). The court cited 3 Wig-
more, Evidence § 2040 (1st ed. 1904).
19Goins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1938), Petition for cert. dism., 306
U.S. 622 (1939); see McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727
(1940); 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 786 (1960); 40 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 344 (1949); 44
Mich. L. Rev. 483 (1945); 35 So. Calif. L. Rev. 86 (1961); 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79 (1942);
28 Va. L. Rev. 102 (1941).
20Holy v. United States, 278 Fed. 521 (7th Cir. 1921).
" Phair v. United States, 60 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1932). See also United States v.
Laurelli, 293 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 961 (1962); United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1954).
22Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 842
(1945). See also May v. United States, 280 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1960); Spaeth v. United
States, 218 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1955). In 1962 the Fifth Circuit took the same view.
Paternosto v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 307 (5th Cir. 1962).
"Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015 (1954).
See also Cook v. United States, 20 App. D.C. 427, 6 Ann. Cas. 810 (D.C. Cir. 1906).
'
4 Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 (1941). This holding was followed in
Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945); United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d
Cit. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884 (9th
Cir. 1949); Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
842 (1945).
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The special rule which bars conviction of perjury solely upon the
evidence of a single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries. That
it renders successful perjury prosecutions more difficult than it other-
wise would be is obvious, and most criticism of the rule has stemmed
from this result. It is argued that since effective administration of
justice is largely dependent upon truthful testimony, society is ill-
served by an "anachronistic" rule which tends to burden and discourage
prosecutions for perjury. Proponents of the rule, on the other hand,
contend that society is well-served by such consequences. Lawsuits
frequently engender in defeated litigants sharp resentments and hos-
tilities against adverse witnesses, and it is argued, not without per-
suasiveness, that rules of law must be so fashioned as to protect honest
witnesses from hasty and spiteful retaliation in the form of unfounded
perjury prosecutions.
The rule may originally have stemmed from quite different reasoning,
but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has been the fear
that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted in per-
jury prosecutions if a less-stringent rule were adopted.
Whether it logically fits into one testimonial pattern or not, the
government has not advanced sufficiently cogent reasons to cause us
to reject the rule. 5
A recent Second Circuit case has cast some doubts on the old
attitudes and seems to have taken a step towards the rejection of a
quantitative rule. In United States v. Collins"0 the defendant appeared
before a grand jury with respect to minutes he had prepared as the
secretary of a Teamster's local under the direction of James Hoffa,
the union president. The defendant admitted signing the minutes in
1953 and stated under oath that they had not been later changed.
The defendant was prosecuted for perjury, and the government in-
troduced into evidence expert testimony that the machine upon
which the minutes were typed had not been put on the market by
the manufacturer until 1955. Thereafter, a second expert witness,
employed by the F.B.I. as a document examiner, testified that the
minutes were typed on a machine which the union local had pur-
chased from the manufacturer in 1956. A conviction was affirmed on
the basis of this evidence and in the absence of any direct testimonial
evidence establishing the falsity of the statement alleged to have been
made by the defendant. Thus, it would seem that the holding was not
based on the documentary exception, nor, obviously, on an applica-
tion of the "two witnesses" rule. The court apparently held (1)
that the test was not whether the evidence was direct or circum-
" Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1945).
"' United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1959),
noted, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 786 (1960), 35 So. Calif. L. Rev. 86 (1961).
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stantial and (2) that the evidence must be of such a quality that it
will assure that the defendant's guilt is solidly founded. Neverthe-
less, the court was cautious and stated that the situation was "akin
to the use of documents signed by the witness ... ""
B. Proof Required For A Perjury Conviction
The general rule appears to be that to convict a person of perjury,
positive and direct evidence is necessary; circumstantial evidence
standing alone is never sufficient."8 Also, even though the evidence
offered is documentary, this does not dispense with the requirement
that it be direct and positive. " In 1959 the Second Circuit took a
position contradictory to the direct evidence requirement. That
court held that testimony "in a sense circumstantial" may be sufficient
to support a perjury conviction if it is "absolutely inconsistent" with
the defendant's innocence." A few prior decisions had likewise
criticized the direct evidence rule.2 '
One court created an exception to the rule by holding that cir-
cumstantial evidence was admissible only when the nature of the
false testimony was such that no direct testimony of its falsity could
be obtained, such as testimony about the witness's knowledge or
belief.2  In a somewhat similar vein, the Second Circuit has stated:
Since the crime of perjury consists in the contradiction between the
accused's oath and his belief, the only "direct" evidence of his guilt
would seem to be his own declarations of his belief. But the law is
71d. at 652.
28Spaeth v. United States, 218 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1955); Radomsky v. United States,
180 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1950); Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1932), aff'd,
289 U.S. 1 (1933); United States v. Otto, 54 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1931), noted, 80 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1026 (1932); Clayton v. United States, 284 Fed. 537 (4th Cir. 1922); Allen v. United
States, 194 Fed. 664 (4th Cir. 1912).
This is the view of the majority of state court decisions. See Annots., 44 L.R.A. (n.s.)
513 (1913); 15 A.L.R. 634 (1921); 27 A.L.R. 857 (1923); 42 A.L.R. 1063 (1926);
111 A.L.R. 825 (1937); 38 Va. L. Rev. 104 (1952). For criticism of this view, see 3
Wigmore, Evidence § 2042, at 281 (3d ed. 1940); McClintock, supra note 19, at 745; 21
I11. L. Rev. 46 (1926); 44 Mich. L. Rev. 483 (1945); 5 Minn. L. Rev. 553 (1921); 35
So. Calif. L. Rev. 86 (1961); 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 77 (1957); 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1026 (1932).
25Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1950); Allen v. United States,
194 Fed. 664 (4th Cir. 1912).
'0 United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911
(1960); see Jacobs v. United States, 31 F.2d 568 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 869
(1929).
as Goins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1938), petition for cert. dismissed, 306
U.S. 622 (1939); Cohen v. United States, 27 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1928). Compare Annot.,
111 A.L.R. 826 (1937), citing other federal cases.
2Behrle v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 304, 100 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Circum-
stantial evidence was held sufficient to prove the falsity of defendant's denial of recollection
of the facts. See United States v. Nicoletti, 310 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1962); 51 Colum. L.
Rev. 1056, 1057 (1951); 70 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1956).
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well settled that his declarations, if oral, will not satisfy the rule,
although they will if written and corroborated."3
The court reserved opinion on another possible exception, that of
contradicting oral declarations by the accused under oath, since the
issue did not properly present itself in the case. 4
It has been held that an unsworn contradictory statement of a
defendant is not proof of perjury."5 Hence, what the defendant may
tell two witnesses in private conversation prior to a grand jury meet-
ing may not be used to contradict his testimony to the grand jury.
More credence should be given to statements of a defendant made
under oath. Moreover, it has even been held that conflicting state-
ments under oath, without further corroboration of the defendant's
belief, were not sufficient to convict."
Must a trial judge on request of a defendant instruct a jury that
the government must prove the charge of perjury by two witnesses
or by one witness and corroborative evidence? Two lower federal
court cases have answered in the affirmative,"7 but in 1944 the Third
Circuit held to the contrary."8 The court felt that the instruction
would confuse the jury, and since that group must make an in-
dependent decision as to the credibility of each government witness
before determining guilt, improper acquittals might result. How-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 9 The Court
reasoned that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or con-
victed of perjury if a less stringent rule were adopted and the in-
struction refused. The Court noted that in 1911 an English par-
liamentary committee had favored the older rule and that Parliament
had subsequently enacted it into statute.
33 United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 895(1951). Compare Paternosto v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 1962).
" The court cited 7 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 28, at § 2043.
"SClayton v. United States, 284 Fed. 537 (4th Cir. 1922). But see United States v.
Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430 (1840); 7 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 2043.
' United States v. Golan, 24 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1938); see 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1165
(1955); 21 Mich. L. Rev. 218 (1922); 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79 (1942).
The English law is similar. See Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, § 598, at 482 (17 ed.
Turner 1958). Concerning proposed changes in Canada, see 31 Can. B. Rev. 200 (1953).
As to proposed federal statutes, see 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1165, 1175 (1955); 35 So. Calif. L.
Rev. 86, 98 (1961). Illinois and New York have adopted provisions regarding contradictory
statements under oath. I11. Rev. Stat. c. 38, §§ 475, 475a (1959); N.Y. Pen. Law § 1627.
s7 See Pawley v. United States, 47 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1931); Allen v. United States,
194 Fed. 664 (4th Cir. 1912).
as United States v. Weiler, 143 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1944), noted, 23 Texas L. Rev. 404
(1945). The court cited 7 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 28, at §§ 2040-43.
s United States v. Weiler, 323 U.S. 606 (1945), noted, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 483 (1945).
The case was discussed in Smith v. United States, 169 F.2d 118, 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1948),
and was followed in Spaeth v. United States, 218 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1955).
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C. Nature Of The Corroborating Evidence
Dean Wigmore has concluded that as to the "nature of corrobora-
tion, no detailed rule seems to have been laid down, nor ought to
be laid down. The jury should be instructed not to convict unless
the testimony of the principal witness has been so corroborated that
they believe it to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.""0 There are
federal decisions quoting this language favorably,"' and the Third
Circuit, Judge Kalodner writing, has pointed out: "The corrobora-
tive evidence must directly substantiate the testimony of a single
witness who has sworn to the falsity of the alleged perjurious state-
ment and must be equally strong and convincing as the direct testi-
mony which would be regarded as sufficient proof."'" Thus, at a
minimum, the corroborative proof must be clear and so convincing
that, coupled with the evidence of the witness who testifies directly
to the falsity, it satisfies the jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4 '
Since the rule of corroborating proof-which prohibits a perjury
conviction on the unsupported testimony of a single witness-does
not "relate to the kind or amount of other evidence required . .. ,
it follows that admissions of the defendant may sometimes be used
to corroborate. One court has stated: "We do not believe an extra-
judicial admission made by an accused is insufficient as corroboration
simply because it is such."'" These corroborating admissions by the
defendant may be presented in evidence by another witness. Thus,
when one witness is supported by the testimony of a second witness,
this is held to be sufficient evidence even though the testimony of the
second witness concerns a statement emanating from the defendant
himself." However, in one case a defendant's errors of memory on
examination were held not to be sufficient corroboration. 7
D. Issues Requiring Corroboration
The rule requiring corroboration applies only to the issue of
falsity.' As one judge stated: "It is not necessary . . .that every
fact which goes to make up the assignment of perjury should be dis-
40 7 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 28, § 2042, at 278-79.
4' Doan v. United States, 202 F.2d 674, 680 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. Rose,
113 F. Supp. 775, 779 (M.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir.
1954).
"' United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 1954); see Cook v. United States,
26 App. D.C. 427, 6 Ann. Cas. 810 (D.C. Cir. 1906).
41 United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 576 (1840).
44Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 627 (1926).
4" Vetterli v. United States, 198 F.2d 291, 293 (9th Cir.), vacated, 344 U.S. 872 (1952).
4 United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
"'United States v. Isaacson, 59 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1932).
"'McClintock, supra note 19, at 747.
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proved by two witnesses, for the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to prove that the defendant swore as is alleged in the
indictment . . . ." He continued, "Every material allegation in the
indictment may be shown by a single witness, except the allegation
that the evidence of the prisoner in question was false and that he
did not believe it to be true."5
Many cases have held that the government must corroborate only
the falsity of the oath. 1 The reasoning of this view is that only
the falsity of that statement requires the additional proof, and that
other particular circumstances indicating falsity need no special
corroboration."
With respect to the issue of the defendant's belief that he made
a false statement, it is generally felt that belief as to the falsity of
the former testimony may be inferred by the jury from the falsity
itself." Thus, corroboration of the issue of belief is usually not re-
quired. For example, in a leading case the defendant was convicted
of perjury for denying under oath that he had been a member of
the Communist Party. On appeal, he alleged that the trial court
erred in failing to specify what evidence satisfied the "two witnesses"
rule. It was held that since the offense consisted of misrepresenting
a belief and there was no direct evidence of the belief, the corrobora-
tion rule required that the charge point out appropriate evidence
which would justify a jury's inference that the defendant believed
that he had been a member." In some cases, however, there can be
no inference or belief from the fact of falsity, as for example, when
the false testimony concerns a triviality or an ancient occurrence."
Possibly in these relatively rare cases, corroboration of testimony
relating to belief may be required.
"' United States v. Hall, 44 Fed. 864, 868 (S.D. Ga. 1890).
1o Id. at 869-70.
" See United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cit.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952); United States v. Hiss,
185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); United States v. Seavey,
180 F.2d 837 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979 (1950); United States v. Palese, 133
F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. Rose, 113 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954). See also 7 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 28,
§ 2042, at 280; McClintock, supra note 19, at 767.
"United States v. Margolis, 138 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. Rose,
supra note 51.
"See Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015
(1954); United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 895
(1951); United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948
(1951).
4United States v. Remington, supra note 53, noted, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 1056 (1951);
65 Harv. L. Rev. 520 (1952); 38 Va. L. Rev. 104 (1952).
"Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cit.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015
(1954); Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1943).
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One older case aptly illustrates the courts' refusal to require two
witnesses or corroborating circumstances to prove the belief in
falsity. There, the corroboration rule did not apply when the only
facts averred related solely to intent and the only issue was whether
the defendant testified intentionally or through mistake." In that
particular case, the fact of the false testimony was already established. 7
With respect to the issue of falsity, it is important that the testi-
mony of the several witnesses asserting the falsity agree. Otherwise,
a conviction for falsely denying certain statements will probably
not stand if the witnesses disagree as to the statements made."
A different aspect of the problem of deciding which issues require
corroboration is that of determining whether the corroborating evi-
dence must relate precisely to the transaction showing falsity that
is the subject of the witness's testimony. If a statement of an alleged
perjuror contains a single fact and that fact is contradicted (1) by
a witness and (2) by corroborating evidence which relates to the
same transaction that was the subject of the testimony of that wit-
ness, the perjury rule as to corroborative proof has unquestionably
been satisfied." Suppose, however, that the corroboration relates to
a transaction different from that testified to by the witness who
has directly contradicted the accused's statement of a single fact.
For example, the statement is that X did not pay anyone to vote,
the evidence is that A said he was paid to vote, and B's testimony
tends to show that he was paid to vote."° Or suppose the statement
charged to be false contains several facts and there is adduced direct
testimony of a particular fact plus evidence corroborating that fact
but relating to a different, though similar transaction. For example,
the statement is that X never paid A or B, the evidence is that A
said he was paid on one occasion, and another witness said A was
paid on a different occasion."
Some state courts without adverting to these factual distinctions
have held such indirect corroboration sufficient, because the indict-
ment is construed to contain only one "assignment" of perjury. "
However, if the indictment is interpreted as including more than
56 O'Leary v. United States, 158 Fed. 796 (lst Cir. 1907).
57ld. at 799.
a Phair v. United States, 60 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1932).
5'See Arena v. United States, 226 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954
(1956); United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Remington,
191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 895 (1951).
0 See United States v. Palese, 133 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943).
,1 See United States v. Seavey, 180 F.2d 837 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979 (1950).




one "assignment," the falsity of each factual component of the state-
ment or statements must be independently established. Federal de-
cisions have not employed the "assignment" theory and have con-
cluded that the evidence in the cases mentioned above is sufficiently
probative of the proposition that the defendant swore falsely to
allow the issue to go to the jury. These cases held that the falsity of
each component fact constituting the alleged perjury need not be
independently established to prove the defendant's testimony false. "3
For example, in one case the defendant had made an allegedly false
statement that he had visited the homes of nine women to induce
them to join his union. At his trial for perjury eight of the women
testified that he had never visited their homes. The testimony of the
eight witnesses was held sufficient corroboration for conviction." It
may be objected that in reality the defendant made nine statements,
and that none of the eight women could swear that he had not visited
the others."5 However, the decision may be defended on the ground
that the defendant's statement related to a common denominator. "
In effect, then, both state and federal courts do permit this indirect
type of corroborative evidence to suffice for a perjury conviction.
E. Application Of The Rule In Subornation Of Perjury Cases
In 1925 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enunciated
a liberal rule as to proof of subornation of perjury. At the trial of
the case, the judge had charged that the law did not require any
corroboration of the testimony of the suborned to convict the
suborner. ' On appeal, a conviction was upheld by the Second
Circuit." However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
falsity of the testimony alleged to be perjurious could not be proved
by the unsupported testimony of the subornee-perjuror. " Since
Congress had not legislated, the Court felt that the old rule re-
quiring corroboration was sound and should stand. However, the
Court did not state that the same rule applied to proof of the act
63 United States v. Seavey, 180 F.2d 837 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 979 (1950);
United States v. Palese, 133 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943).4 May v. United States, 280 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1960), noted, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 98
(1961); 10 U. Kan. L. Rev. 475 (1962).
6
'
5 See 10 U. Kan. L. Rev. 475 (1962).
66 See 61 Colum. L. Rev. 98 (1961).6 United States v. Hammer, 299 Fed. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), rev'd, 271 U.S. 620
(1926).
68Hammer v. United States, 6 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1925), noted, 10 Minn. L. Rev. 167
(1926). The court cited 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2042, at 323 (2d ed. 1923). In Boren v.
United States, 144 Fed. 801 (9th Cir. 1906), doubt was expressed that corroboration was
necessary; however, corroboration was determined to be present.
"
9 Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926).
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of suborning, which is the second element of the crime."0 Apparently,
then, as to the falsity, both parties in a subornation case are ac-
complices; as to the act of subornation, they are not.' Thus, with
respect to both perjury and subornation of perjury, the same rule of
corroborating evidence must be applied to the issue of falsity of the
matter alleged to be perjurious, for falsity is the corpus delecti in
both.'
In a subsequent case, Judge Learned Hand made the distinction
clear. He stated that in a prosecution for subornation of perjury,
the subornation element of the offense, unlike the perjury element,
did not need to be proved by two witnesses or even by one witness
with corroborating evidence. s The Ninth Circuit also adopted this
view, 4 as did the Fifth,' the Eighth, 6 and the Third."
F. Other Types Of Cases In Which The Rule Is Applied
Lower federal courts have applied the perjury corroboration re-
quirement in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 for offenses which
under the common law would be perjury"8 and false swearing. 7
However, the rule is not applied to prosecutions under the false
claims statute"0 or under the statute making obstruction of justice
an offense.' Also, there is uncertainty concerning its application to
false statements in naturalization proceedings." In the cases involving
the filing of false non-Communist affidavits, the rule has not been
invoked. "a
70 For cases holding that on this element the evidence of the suborned alone is sufficient,
see Boren v. United States, 144 Fed. 801 (9th Cir. 1906); United States v. Thompson, 31
Fed. 331 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887).
7' United States v. Thompson, supra note 70.
7 2 See 10 Minn. L. Rev. 167 (1926).
71 Cohen v. United States, 27 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1928); see 10 Minn. L. Rev. 167
(1926); 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 77 (1957). See also United States v. Giddens, 273 F.2d 843
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 971 (1960).
71 Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1949). The court cited McClintock,
What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727, 750 (1940), and 56 A.L.R. 408-14
(1928). See also Doan v. United States, 202 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1953).
71 Culwell v. United States, 194 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1952); Outlaw v. United States, 81
F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936).
7Segal v. United States, 246 F.2d 814 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).7
1United States v. Silverman, 106 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1939).
70Arena v. United States, 226 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954
(1956).
"United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952).
s0 United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962);
Todorow v. United States, 173 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949).
8' Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1949).
1
2 Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1952), rev'd per curiam, 345 U.S.
979 (1953).
83 Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Killian, 246
F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1957); Gold v. United States, 237 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd
per curiam, 352 U.S. 985 (1957); Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1956).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
According to some cases, making a false oath in a bankruptcy
proceeding is not the same as perjury; hence the "two witnesses"
rule is inapplicable.84 However, uncertainty in this area resulted
from a 1926 Supreme Court holding that false testimony before a
referee in bankruptcy may constitute perjury as may the intentional
making of a false oath in a formal bankruptcy proceeding. The
Court did not state, however, that every false oath in bankruptcy
matters was perjury."
III. RECENT PROPOSALS
The Model Act on Perjury, approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar
Association in 1952, provides: "Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is sufficient for conviction under this Act, and it shall not
be necessary also that proof be by a particular number of witnesses
or by documentary or other type of evidence."" The act represents
the view advocated by Dean Wigmore-that the "two witnesses"
rule be abolished."7 A few states have adopted this approach by
judicial decision," but only one state, Arizona, has adopted the
Model Act."
The Tentative Draft No. 6 of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code, dated May 6, 1957, provided in section 208.20 on per-
jury as follows:
(6) Corroboration. Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt shall
suffice for conviction under this section as in other criminal cases,
without special requirement of two witnesses or corroborating cir-
cumstances. [Alternate, rejected by the Council: No person shall be
convicted of an offense under this Section where proof of falsity rests
solely upon contradition by testimony of a single person other than
the defendant.]"
Interestingly enough, the majority view reflected in the Tentative
Draft of the Model Penal Code was rejected in the Proposed Official
Draft dated May 4, 1962. In section 241.1 on perjury, this latest
draft incorporates the bracketed language above."' The Model Penal
84Schonfeld v. United States, 277 Fed. 934 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 623
(1922); Kahn v. United States, 214 Fed. 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 765 (1914).
85 Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926).
8 Model Act on Perjury § 4 (1952) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws).
877 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 28, § 2041.
88 See Comment, Proof of Perjury: The Two Witness Requirement, 35 So. Calif. L. Rev.
86, 94-96 (1961).
88 Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-561 to -572 (1956).
80Model Penal Code § 208.20 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
8 1Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft § 241.1 (May 4, 1962).
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Code Advisory Committee had recommended elimination of the
role requiring corroboration, as did the Council.92 However, the
Reporter favored greater protection of the defendant and urged
acceptance of the "Alternate" provision. He argued that a defendant
was entitled to more protection in a perjury prosecution for two
reasons. First, a perjury trial often will be the second time that the
credibility of the defendant's oath has been tried, as when an
acquitted defendant is tried for perjury committed in his own
defense. Second, a perjury prosecution based on facts long past is
always a distinct possibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Reporter's analysis is sound. The rights of a defendant have
traditionally and rightfully been guarded in perjury trials by the
"two witnesses" rule. Although the present Model Code provision
may possibly lead to some weakening of the orthodox corroboration
requirement, it certainly will not permit a conviction of the serious
offense of perjury to result from the testimony of a single witness
uncorroborated by any other evidence-an important protection
against "grudge" prosecutions and unjustified convictions. Accord-
ingly, this writer recommends the adoption of the Model Penal Code
provision in the Proposed Official Draft.
"See Model Penal Code 137, comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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